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ABSTRACT
Thispaper tests several competing models of municipal bond market
equilibrium. It analyzes the influence of changes in both personal and cor-
porate tax reforms on the yield spread between taxable and tax—exempt interest
rates. The findings suggest that changes in personal income tax rates have
pronounced effects on long—term niunicipal interest rates, but small effects on
short—maturity yields. Corporate tax reforms, however, affect both long— and
short—term yields. These results are inconsistent with the view that the
relative yields on taxable and tax—exempt bonds are set by banks and insurance
companies which are taxed at the corporate rate. They support the more tradi-
tional view that banks are the primary holders of short—term muncipal securi-
ties, while households are the principal investors in the long—term municipal
market. This view suggests that proposals to reform municipal financing poli-
cies by increasing the use of short—term borrowing, or issuing long—term





(617) 253—6673The early 1980s was a period of turbulence in the niinicipal bond
market. Interest rates on tax—exempt securities reached record heights, both
in nominal terms and relative to comparably—risky taxable bonds. Between
January 1980 and January 1982, the yield differential between prin, long—term
municipal bonds and U.S. Treasury obligations fell from 375to175 basis
points. The yield spread on short—term bonds also declined, butbya smaller
amount. The income tax rate at which an investor would be indifferent between
holding long—term taxable or tax—exempt securities declined dramatically, from
thirty five percent to less than fifteen percent. During the same period,
voter resistance to higher taxes, recession—induced service demands, and
reductions in federal grants increased state and local borrowing by nearly
fifty percent, even though many jurisdictions forewent capital expenditures
because of high interest rates.
The escalation of tax—exempt interest rates has been attributed to
many factors. Increased municipal risk, an increased supply of tax—exempt
securities such as industrial revenue bonds, falling marginal tax rates among
personal investors, and changes in commercial bank behavior have all been
advanced as possible explanations.1 The shrinking yield differential between
taxable and tax—exempt securities has germinated many proposals designed to
reduce the real cost of debt finance by altering municipal borrowing practices.
Proposals include increased use of short—term debt, issuing "put bonds" which
grant the bondholder the right to terminate his debt contract after a fixed
number of years, and use of floating—rate long—term bonds. There has also been
renewed interest in the long—standing plan for replacing the current income tax
exemption for municipal interest with a federal subsidy to state and local—2—
borrowing. The likely impact of these proposals on municipal interest costs is
controversial, largely because of disagreement over the forces behind the recent
increase in tax exempt interest rates.
There are several competing theories of how equilibrium yields are
determined in the municipal bond market. One view holds that commercial banks
are the marginal holders of municipal debt, since they are the only class of
investors who are able to borrow at the after—tax interest rate and invest the
proceeds in tax—exempt securities. This view implies that only the tax rates
facing commercial banks should affect the municipal—taxable yield spread.A
second view, which has developed from research on a theory of corporatecapi-
talstructure proposed by Merton Miller (1977), also relates the yield spread
tocorporate tax rates. InMiller's nde1, changes in the relative supplies
ofcorporate debt and corporate equity ensure that the marginal investor
choosing between holding taxable and tax—exempt debt faces an interest tax
rate equal to the statutory corporate rate. The model predicts that changes
in investor tax rates should have no effect on the relative prices of taxable
and tax—exempt bonds, although they might affect the equilibrium quantities of
different securities.
A third and more traditional view, described by Mussa and Kormendi
(1979) and Hendershott and Koch (1977), holds that the municipal bond market
issegmented by maturities. Different classes of investors hold long— and
short—term bonds, with banks predominating at short maturities and households
purchasing must long—term debt. Under this view, personal taxchangesshould
affect the yield spread on long—term bonds, but should have little impact on—3—
therelative yields on short—term taxable and tax—exempt bonds.
This paper examines the impact of changing tax expectations on the
taxable—tax exempt yield spread. In particular, it tests the hypothesis that
downward revisions in expected personal tax rates can lower the yield spread
betweentaxable and tax exempt debt. Only the third ndel predicts that such
changes should affect relative bond prices. By examining data from four
events which substantially altered tax rates —the196k Kennedy—Johnson tax
cut, the Vietnam War tax surcharge, the 1969 Tax Reform Act, and the 1981 tax
cut ——thisstudy provides new evidence that both personal and corporate tax
changes affect the relative yields on taxable and tax—free bonds. These
results help distinguish among the competing models of municipal market
equilibrium, and illuminate questions about how various policy changes would
affect municipal borrowing costs.
The findings also suggest that expected tax changes explain a
sizable fraction of the recent narrowing in the taxable—tax exempt yield
spread. The passage of the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act was contemporaneous
with a twenty—five percent reduction in the yield spread between long—term
municipal and taxable bonds. Although tax reforms cannot explain the entire
increase in tax exempt yields relative to taxable yields during the early
1980s, they appear to have had a significant effect.
This paper is divided into five sections. The first chronicles move-
ments in municipal borrowing costs during the last three decades. The second
section presents the three competing models of municipal debt pricing in
greater detail and identifies the predictions of each regarding the impact of—'4—
taxchanges on yield spreads. The third section describes rrr data set and
explains the procedure which was used to identify periods of changing tax
expectations. The fourth section presents empirical evidence on the effects
of tax changes during the last two decades on the taxable—tax exempt yield
spread. The concluding section reviews the implications of nr results for
proposals to reform nnnicipal borrowing policies.—5.-
1.Recent Movements in Municipal Borrowing Costs
This section describes recent movements in the yield spread between
taxable and tax—exempt interest rates. Monthly interest rate data were obtained
from Salomon Brothers' Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads. These
data, derived from yield curves for par bonds with current issue charac-
teristics, are calculated on the first of each nnth. The differential between
taxable and tax—exempt yields can be described by the implicit tax rate, 61,
which would characterize an investor who was indifferent between the two yields.
This tax rate is defined by (lO1)R =R,where R is the yield on a taxable bond
and RM is the yield on a comparably—risky tax—exempt security.
The implicit tax rates reported here are calculated from yields on
new—issue Treasury securities and prime grade general obligation tax—exempt
bonds.Both securities are close to riskless.2 "Prime" is the highest rating
awarded to municipal bonds by Salomon Brothers. The restriction to general
obligation bonds is also important, since many recent events such as the
Washington Public Power Supply System default have altered the perceived
riskiness of revenue bonds issued by states and localities. These developments
shouldhave had a much smaller effect on the market for general obligation
bonds, which are backed by the "full faith and credit" of the issuing govern-
ment.
Table 1 reports annual average values of the implicit tax rates on
one,five, ten, and twenty year bonds for the period 1955—83. The series
showpronounced declines in the implied tax rateson both long and short
maturity bonds between 1919 and 1982. The twenty year implied tax rate declinedTable 1
Tax Rates Implied by Taxable and Tax Exempt Bond Yields, 1955—83
TreasuryBondsversus Prime Grade Municipals
20Year 10Year 5 Year 1 Year
Year Maturity Maturity Maturity Maturity
1955 .244 .3141 .406 .14114
1956 .219 .279 .333 .413
1957 .151 .222 .296 .380
1958 .189 .262 .326 .412
1959 .222 .290 .376 .433
1960 .227 .293 .364 .1422
1961 .190 .284 .397 .1476
1962 .256 .353 .423 .468
1963 .261 .351 .412 .465
1964 .265 .327 .375 .4142
1965 .264 .316 .346 .1426
1966 .227 .266 .316 .336
1967 .239 .286 .325 .370
1968 .226 .282 .330 .405
1969 .133 .214 .278 .344
1970 .101 .259 .353 .387
1971 .130 .292 .390 .405
1972 .i514 .331 .388 .435
1973 .282 .339 .374 .453
1974 .282 .300 .366 .424
1975 .217 .266 .364 .408
1976 .276 .361 .424 .475
1977 .322 .406 .439 .507
1978 .346 .408 .436 .493
1979 .355 .4iT .429 .1497
1980 .308 .400 .439 .485
1981 .229 .323 .395 .1463
1982 .i54 .249 .336 .424
1983 .206 .281 .372 .14145
Averages:
1955—59 .205 .279 .348 .1411
1960—69 .229 .297 .357 .415
1970—79 .247 .338 .396 .14148
1980—83 .224 .313 .386 .1454
Source: Salomon Brothers, Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads and
author' s calculations.—6—
bymore than twenty percentage points during this period. The tax rates implied
by short term yields declined less dramatically, from fifty to forty—two per-
cent. These changes are larger than those observed in any other three—year
period in the postwar era.
The table also shows that in every year the implicit tax rate on short
term bonds was substantially higher than that on any of the long term bonds.
The divergence was most pronounced in the late 1960s and early 1980s, when the
difference between the implicit tax rates on one and twenty year bonds
exceeded twenty—five percentage points. There are also persistent differences
in the levels of long— and short—term municipal interest rates. Throughout
the postwar period, long—term tax—exempt interest rates bave exceeded short—
term rates, often by as much as fifty percent. The perennial upward slope in
the tax—exempt term structure is the motivation for some recent proposals to
increase state and local short—term borrowing.
Several warnings about the use of implied tax rates must be issued
before drawing strong conclusions from the data in Table 1. First, if there are
differential expected capital gains on municipal and Treasury bonds, then the
implied tax rates will not reflect marginal interest tax rates.3 If the
expected capital gain on a taxable bond is larger than that on a comparable tax—
exempt bond, then their yields to maturity will be closer than they would be
assuming equal capital gains. This will bias the implied tax rate towards
zero.
Tax reforms are one source of capital gains and losses. If tax rates
are expected to decline, then the value of tax—exemption will diminish and the—7—
holders of tax—exempt bonds will experience capital losses. The implied tax
rateon long—maturity bonds will therefore be below the current tax rates
facing investors.The yield spread between short—term taxable and tax exempt
bondsshould depend on current tax rules, while the spread at longer maturi-
ties depends on the expected path of tax rates over a longer horizon.
A second problem in comparing the yields on different bonds arises
because long term bonds provide their holders with the opportunity to engage in
tax—trading strategies. Investors should therefore require a lower coupon
yield than on short—maturity bonds of comparable risk. This contaminates
inferences about the term structure of implied tax rates, and it may also con-
taminate the estimated yield differential between taxable and tax exempt bonds
of the samematurity.Constantinides and Ingersoll (1983) find that the tax
timing option on municipal securities is worth substantially less than the
option on taxable bonds, primarily because there are no tax advantages asso-
ciated with establishing an above—par basis in a municipal bond. The implied
tax rate calculated from yields to maturity will therefore underestimate the
actual tax rates on investors, with larger biases for longer maturity bonds.
These biases can cause large errors in the levels of implied tax rates calcu-
lated from long term yield data. However, the changes in implied tax rates,
which I focus on, may be less subject to these biases.
A third difficulty with implied tax rates is caused by differential
risk. If prime municipals are riskier than Treasury bonds, then the estimated
marginal tax rates are biased downward. Moreover, there may be a larger risk
differential between long—term municipal and Treasury bondsthanbetween short—-8-
termbonds of these types, implyingthatthe bias is greater on long—maturity
bonds. If the perceived riskiness of nunicipal securities has increased in
recent years due to near—defaults or taxpayer revolts, it could account for
declining implicit tax rates. However, the change in default probabilities
requiredto explain the recent narrowing of the yield spread is implausibly
large.5
Thispaper focuses on the effects of expected tax changes in
explaining monthly changes in the taxable—tax exempt yield spread. The next
section outlines several models with different predictions about which tax rates
determine the taxable—tax exempt yield spread. Subsequent sections provide
empirical evidence on how announcements of impending tax reform influence the
relative yields of taxable and tax—exempt bonds.—9—
2.Alternative Models of Municipal Bond Market Equilibrium
The prices of taxable andtaxexempt bonds are determined in a finan-
cial general equilibrium. Anyanalysisof the relative yields on taxable and
municipal bonds must therefore specify the behavior of firms and governments who
supply these assets as well as the investors who demand them. This section
discusses three competing theories of the determination of the taxable—tax
exempt yield spread. They generate different predictions regarding how
changing tax expectations should affect the implied tax rates calculated from
yields to maturity.
2.1 TheBankArbitrage Hypothesis
Thefirst model was developed by Eugene Fama (197T)andhas sub-
sequently received favorable empirical support from Skelton (1983). Fama noted
thatone class of investors, commercial banks, can operate simultaneously in
both the taxable and tax exempt bond markets. Unlike most other investors,
banks are permitted to deduct interest payments from their taxable profits even
while investing in tax—exempt securities. If the tax—exempt yield, RM, exceeds
the after—tax cost of bank borrowing (l—r)R, where tisthe corporate tax rate
and R is the taxable interest rate, then commercial banks will issue taxable
bonds or notes and purchase municipal securities. By demanding municipal bonds,
banks will drive up prices and lower yields until RM =(l—r)R.Alternatively,
if municipal yields are below this level, banks will reduce their holdings of
municipal bonds and use the proceeds to extend other loans. Since banks have
held large amounts of municipal debt for most of the past three decades, and—10—
currently ownmorethan one—third of outstanding state and local debt, they have
ample reserves to undertake these portfolio adjustments. This model suggests
that while the yield spread between taxable and tax—exempt bonds should be
stable, the monthly changes in commercial bank holdings of su.nicipal debt could
be quite volatile.
There seems little doubt that banks undertake the tax arbitrage tran-
sactions described above, especially with short—term bonds.6 Beek (1982)
reports that fifty—two percent of the tax exempt debt held by commercial banks
is of less than one year maturity, while ninety—two percent of bank holdings
have maturities of less than five years. The role of banks in performing tax—
arbitrage with long—term bonds is more doubtful, and may be restricted by insti-
tutional limitations and other factors. Skelton (1983) notes that
...banks maydeductthe interest payments on debt
obligations incurred in the normal course of bus-
iness while receiving tax—exempt coupon payments.
...however, liabilities with maturities in excess
of three years are considered to be potential con-
tributions to capital and as such are subject to
scrutiny of the tax authorities. In addition, long
term debt issues by banks must be approved by the
Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC who, as a
rule, limit such financing to one third of total
capital. This special opportunity for banks,
therefore, is limited to the short end of the
maturity spectrum. [Skelton (1983), p. 31.61
Even if banks cannot issue long—maturity debt, of course, they should be able to
undertake arbitrage in the long—term market by issuing short—term securities
while purchasing long term bonds. This exposes them to some real interest rate
risk, but this is a type of risk which they are frequently called upon to hedge.—11—
The bank arbitrage analysis implies that changes in the stock of imini—
cipal debt outstanding will have no impact on the relative yields of taxable and
tax—exempt debt. Changes in security volume will require more or less borrowing
or lending by banks, but the relative yields will not change. In this model,
we do not have to explain the debt supply behavior of states and localities in
order to determine equilibrium prices.
Tax changes, however, can affect the yield spread. A temporary reduc-
tion in the corporate tax rate will lead to a substantial narrowing of the
short—term yield spread but only a small change in long—term yields. A reduc-
tion in expected future corporate tax rates would reduce the current yield
spread on long—maturity bonds, with no effect on short—term yields. More impor-
tantly, the model suggests that personal tax rates are irrelevant for deter-
mining municipal interest rates.
The bank arbitrage model suggests that absent any variation over
time in expected corporate tax rates, divergences in the yields on taxable and
tax exempt bonds at varying maturities must be attributable to the risk
characteristics of the different securities. Fama (1971) argues that although
yields to maturity on comparably—rated corporate and municipal bonds fre-
quently imply tax rates below the corporate tax rate, especially at long
maturities, this is due to inadequate risk comparison. He suggests that since
bondholders are less able to enforce restrictive covenants against municipal
than against corporate borrowers, and since local government assets are vir-
tually impossible to seize during bankruptcy, tax exenpt bonds are riskier
than corporate debt. These factors, combined with uncertainties about future—12—
political actions, induce higher yields on long—maturity municipal bonds than
on top—quality corporate debt.
One piece of evidence against this explanation of long—term yield dif-
ferentials was provided by Gordon and Malkiel (1981). They compared the yields
on long—term corporate bonds and industrial revenue bonds which were backed by
the same firms. These bonds were similar in all respects except their tax
treatment, with the industrial revenue bonds providing tax exempt interest. The
yields on these securities suggested implied tax rates of about twenty—five per-
cent, substantially lower than the prevailing corporate tax rate. Differential
risk cannot explain this divergence.
The bank arbitrage model is appealing for its simple account of
equilibrium pricing in the municipal bond market. However, it nay be of limited
relevance for describing future developments in this market. Table 2 shows
the holdings of municipal debt by commercial banks, households, and property
and casualty insurance companies during the period since 1955. Commercial
banks' share of the tax—exempt market has declined in each of the last eleven
years. Their holdings have declined precipitously since 1980, falling from
forty—two percent of the outstanding stock to just over thirty—three percent
at the beginning of 19814. As a result, households have become increasingly
important as holders of municipal debt.
The recent decline in commercial bank activity in municipal debt is
attributable to three factors. First, changes in the availability of other
sources of tax—sheltered income, particularly the rise in leasing since 1980,










Commercial Insurance Commerical Insurance
Banks HouseholdsCompanies Banks HouseholdsCompanies
1955 .282 .1422 .091 .003 .684 .160
1956 .264 .435 .099 .029 .647 .213
1957 .262 .432 .104 .248 .378 .156
1958.282 .405 .106 .462 .146 .129
1959 .261 .1430 .111 .053 .752 .183
1960 .250 .435 .1114 .113 .489 .177
1961 .270 .1422 .119 .463 .371 .201
1962.316 .388 .122 1.009 —.043 .166
1963 .3146 .368 .122 .809 .085 .133
19614 .362 .373 .118 .666 .385 .073
1965 .387 .363 .113 .699 .245 .056
1966 .389 .382 .114 .325 .903 .159
1967 .4143 .335 .119 1.195 —.342 .199
1968 .1478 .305 .117 .896 —.133 .105
1969 .14147 .352 .ii6 .005 .993 .119
1970 .4614 .3)40 .117' .993 —.0614
1971 .505 .297 .122 .721 —.001 .2014
1972 .513 .277 .135 .477 .156 .297
1973 .500 .280 .147 .377 .359 .253
19714 .1494 .290 .i48 .305 .517 .138
1975 .1472 .3014 .149 .045 .14314 .195
1976 .443 .303 .155 .172 —.028 .510
1977 .4141 .276 .178 .361 —.115 .623
1978 .432 .255 .208 .382 —.152 .673
1979 .1426 .256 .223 .320 .305 .372
1980 .420 .257 .230 .1434 .217 .302
1981 .413 .265 .228 .151 .503 .178
1982 .386 .290 .215 .035 .538 .079
1983 .3145 .333 .19)4 —.014 .609 .035
Averages:
1955—59.270 .1425 .102 .159 .521 .i68
1960—69 .369 .372 .117 .624 .295 .139
1970—79 .469 .288 .158 .415 .1141 .3141
1980—83 .3914 .282 .219 .126 .472 .166
Notes:The first three columns report the fraction of state and local obliga-
tions outstanding at the end of each year which are held by each class
of investor. The last three columns report the ratio of the change in
each investor class' holdings to the total change in debt outstanding.
Data are drawn from the Flow of Funds accounts.—l 3-.
loweringtax liability. Second, bank profits were depressed in 1981 and 1982;
this diminished the need for exempt income. Finally, the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 limited banks' interest deductions to eighty
five percent of the carrying costs of their municipal bond investments. This
reduced the attractiveness of the tax arbitrage described above, and led to
increased investment in other assets. The future role of commercial banks in
themunicipal market remains uncertain.
2.2. The Miller Model
The second modelof the municipal market was developed by Merton
Miller (1971), primarily to analyze questions about corporate capital structure.
It emphasizes the role of corporations as suppliers of debt and equity in deter-
mining the pattern of equilibrium yields. To highlight the role of tax clien—
teles, I shall present the model in a world of certainty.
First, consider the situation in which there are no municipal bonds.
Firms earn a fixed pretax return R on their investments.If a firm is
financed exclusively with debt, then the after—tax return received by its
owners is (1—m)R, where m is the investors' tax rate on interest income.
Since for tax purposes interest payments are deductable from corporate pro-
fits, corporate profits tax liability equals zero. By comparison, if the firm
were financed with equity, shareholders would receive an after—tax return of
(l_T)(l_Te)R, where Te is the effective marginal tax rate on equity income and t
isthe corporate tax rate. If shareholders face different marginal tax rates,
then those for whom (1.-rn) >(1_t)(lte)will hold debt while those for whom—114
(1—rn) (l_T)(1_Te) will invest in equity. This condition can be rewritten as
I(m—T)/(1—T). In equilibrium, investors will be completely specialized in
holding either debt or equity.
Aggregate corporate financial policy is determined by the relationship
(Debt/Equity) =n,where
Net Worth Held by Investors with (rn—I )/(1—t )<T
(i) =
NetWorth Held by Investors with (m_Te)/(l_re) ) T
Therelative returns on debt and equity satisfy
(2) (lTe*)Req =(1_rn*)R
where the pretax equity return is Req =(l—t)R.The marginal tax rates facing
investors who are indifferent between debt and equity are indicated by
asterisks; they satisfy (1_Te*)(l_r)R =(1_rn*)R.Corporations adjust their
debt—equity ratios to ensure that all investors for whom (1_Te)Req exceeds
(l—m)R are able to hold equity, and all those for whom (l—m)R >(1_Te)Reqcan
hold debt.
Tax exempt debt, M, can be introduced into this framework.7 If
there are no taxes on equity income and there is no uncertainty then municipal
debt and corporate equity are perfect substitutes and they must have the same
return. This return must equal (1—r)R. If there are taxes on equity income,
then investors who hold municipals will be those for whom RM > (1—m)R and RM >
(l_Te)(l_r)R. Figure 1 summarizes the relationship between an investor's tax














linear function of those on interest income.8 The diagram makes clear that
municipal bond holders are investors who, in the absence of tax—exempt debt,
would have held equity. There is a critical value ofteat which, given RM,
investorswill be indifferent between holding tax exempt debt and taxable
equity. The value of Te suchthat (l_Te)Req =RMwill be defined as Te**; it
corresponds to "the marginal investor" in municipal bonds. Given a stock of
municipal debt M, the relative yield on taxable and tax exempt debt Is deter-
mined by finding te** such that the total wealth held by investors with
8.fld T < Cm—i )/(1_Te) equals M. Municipal and corporate bond yields
are then related by
(3) =(l—T**)R=(l—T**)(1_T)R. m eeq e
In this model, changes in the stock of municipal debt have two
effects. First, an increase in M will lower the value of Te**, sincemore
investors must be induced to hold municipal debt instead of equity. This will
reduce the yield spread between taxable and tax—exempt debt, since
(1L) R —RM=(t+ Te**(lT))R.
In addition, changing the supply of municipal debt will lead to offsetting
adjustmentsincorporate debt equity ratios. The precise nature of this effect
dependscrucially on whether issuing municipal bonds induces a change in the
level of private savings. Assuming that total savings is unaffected by an
increase in the stock of municipal debt, each dollar of municipal debt displaces
onedollar of corporate equity. The corporate debt—equity ratio will satisfy—i6—
(5) =ri(i+
Increasingthe stock of municipal debt will therefore raise the corporate debt—
equity ratio.
If issuing municipal bonds induces a change in private savings, then
the effect on the corporate debt—equity ratio is unclear. If all additional
savings come from investors for whom (i—t) (l—m)/(l—Te), investors who hold
equity in equilibrium, then the debt—equity ratio will raise by less than it
would in the fixed—savings case. If, however, there is increased savings from
individuals for whom (i—i) ((1—m)/(l_Te),then the debt—equity ratio might
decline by more than the amount predicted in (5).
Inconsidering the effect of tax changes on the yield spread, it is
helpful to distinguish between two versions of the Miller model. They will be
labelled Miller Model I and Miller Model II. The first model, which was pre-
sented by Miller (1977) and subsequently supported by Trzcinka (1982) and
others, holds that the effective tax rate on equity income is zero. This
case, which is a special case of the T 0model, is shown graphically in
Figure 2. If the equity tax rate is zero, then the previous conclusions with
respect to changing the stock of municipal debt no longer obtain. Provided M
is less than the total wealth of individuals for whom (l—rn)(l—t), changes in
the stock of tax—exempt debt will have no effect onR4. Since Te**O, p =
(l—t)Rregardless of relative security supplies. As in the bank arbitrage
model, changes in the personal tax code will have no impact ontheyield




Figure 2: Asset Choice in Miller Model I (T =0)
m
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Corporate debt Equity and
R(1-m—17—
however, alter the yield spread between taxable and tax—exempt bonds.
The predictions of this model are therefore identical to those of
the bank arbitrage model. The mechanism which ensures that RN =(1—T)Ris
different, however. This provides one way of distinguishing between the two
views. When there are changes in the tax rates or rules applying to banks,
but not other firms, the Bank Arbitrage model predicts that there will be
changesin the taxable—tax exempt yield spread. Miller Model I n.kes no such
prediction.
The second version of the Miller model, which we have already
describedabove, allows for the possibility that equity tax rates are posi-
tive. This view is supported by the observation that since part of the return
to equity holders is through dividend payments, Te =(l—a)z+am,where a is
the firm's payout ratio, z is the effective tax rate on capital gains, and m
is the dividend tax rate. In many cases the dividend and interest tax rates
are equal. Even if capital gains are untaxed, therefore, the dividend tax
burden should make Tegreaterthan zero. Although Miller and Scholes (1978,
1982) have argued that the interaction of various tax code provisions makes
the effective dividend tax rate zero, their view seems contradicted by evi-
dence on both the tax status of investors (Feenberg (1981)) and some findings
on the behavior of share prices and corporate dividend decisions (Poterba and
Summers (l981)).
InMiller Model II, a change in either the corporate tax rate or the
provisions of the personal tax code affecting the tax rate on equity income will
alterthe yield spread between taxable and tax exempt bonds of comparable risk.—18—
A change in the stock of tax exempt debt could also affect the yield spread,
as described above. Increased municipal borrowing reduces Te** and thereby
narrows the yield spread.
The strict predictions described above about investor specialization
in only one asset depend crucially upon that assumption of perfect certainty.
When corporate debt, equity, and tax exempt bonds are all risky assets, port-
folio choices will not be determined solely by- tax considerations. Auerbach and
King (1983) discuss these issues in greater detail.
2.3 The Preferred Habitat Model
The bank arbitrage model and both Miller models ignore the agency
and transactions costs associated with corporate and municipal finance. Firms
often incur costs from issuing debt rather than equity.9 Maturity—matching, in
which firms, states, and localities attempt to incur liabilities with maturities
roughly equal to those of their assets, also appears to be a prevalent practice.
These market imperfections may restrict movement to equilibrium in the models
described above.
A final viewofmunicipal market equilibrium, the "preferred habitat"
model, holds that states and municipalities have distinct maturity preferences
when issuing different types of debt. Legal restrictions and other factors lead
to the use of long—term bonds when financing capital expenditures, and the use
of short—term debt primarily to smooth fluctuations in revenues. Other institu-
tional constraints and a desire for maturity matching on the part of lenders
lead different classes of investors to hold short— and long—term municipal—19--
bonds. Thus, the markets for shortandlong term municipal debt are not
linkedby- any operative arbitrage mechanism, either on the partofsuppliers
(states and localities) or demanders of debt.
This view explains the divergence in the implied tax rate on short—
andlong—term bonds as due to the varying tax rates facing the dernanders of
municipal debtof different maturities. Mussa and Kormendi (19T9) present a
clear description:
"...commercialbanks are the dominant holders of short—term inunici—
pal bonds and also hold short—term taxable instruments with essen-
tially the same risk and other characteristics. The yield
differential between short—term municipal bonds and comparable
short—term taxable instruments is close to the corporate tax rate of
8 percent, since this is the yield differential that offsets the
tax advantage of short—term municipal bonds for the dominant holder
of such bonds. For long—term municipal bonds, the yield differen-
tial is not set by the tax rate for commercial banks.Bankshold
long—term municipal bonds, but they do not hold any significant
amount of long—term corporate bonds. Hence, the investor who is
just balancing between long—term municipal bonds and long—term cor-
porate bonds cannot be a bank but must be some other investor. For
this investor, the equalizing yield differential is not 18 percent
but only about 30 percent."[Mussa and Korniendi (19T9), p.7]
This model suggests that the short—term municipal market behaves according to the
bank arbitrage mDdel, while at long maturities Miller Model II is a ntre
accurate description of the market.
Under this view, the effect of changing the stock of outstanding debt
will depend upon the maturity at which it is issued. Short term bond issues
will not change the implied tax rate on short maturity municipal debt, while
long—term bonds mayhavean impact on the relative pricing of taxable and tax
exempt securities. The model's predictions with regard to tax changes are also—20—
amix ofthe previous results. Corporate tax changes will affect both the
short— and long—term yield spread between taxable and tax exempt debt. The
effect of personal tax changes, however, will be confined to the long—term yield
spread.
The "preferred habitat" model provides an account of why the implied
tax rates on long and short term municipal debt may differ. However, it also
emphasizes our lack of understanding of municipal financial policy, since it
raises a puzzle: why do municipalities issue long—term debt? If the upward—
sloping tax exempt term structure is partly due to the maturity preference of
municipal bondholders, and high tax bracket investors prefer short maturity
bonds, then states and localities could reduce their borrowing burden by
issuing short term securities. One explanation of their failure to do this is
that there are substantial transactions or administrative costs associated
with rolling over short—maturity debt, or raising taxes topay of f principal
during a liquidity crisis. This argument is mre persuasive in the case of
small townships or municipalities than for cities and states with ongoing
financial needs, since the latter are involved in frequent debt issues.
A second reason for the reluctance to use roll—over short term debt
may be that interest payments over the course of a year become uncertain.
This could impede budgeting, create situations in which tax revenues would not
fully cover expenses, or require more frequent changes in tax rates than under
a system with fixed—rate long—term finance. Finally, the municipalities' fear
of credit rationing cannot be ignored. Prior to the New York City crisis in
19TL_19T5, fifty—three percent of state and local debt issues were at short—21—
maturities. This declined to thirty—five percent in 1976 and 1977, and it has
not exceeded forty percent since then.1° Beek (1982) suggests that thedanger
of beingunable to refinance a short—term bond issueis frequentlya reason
forissuing long—term debt.
Table 3 provides a summary of the three views of municipal market
equilibrium which have been described in this section. It outlines theirpre-
dictions for how tax changes and changes in the stock of municipal debt affect
yield spreads. The shape of the demand curve for municipal debt under each of
the competing hypotheses is shown in Figure 3. The horizontal demandcurves for
municipal securities correspond to either the Bank Arbitrage Model or Miller
Model I. The upward sloping demand curve reflects either the Preferred Habitat
model at long maturities, or Miller Model II. The next two sectionsdevelop
empirical tests which try to distinguish between these views.Table 3: Summary of Alternative Models of Municipal Market Equilibrium
Effect on Taxable—Tax Exempt Yield Spread (by Maturity)
Increasing Raising Raising
Stock of Corporate Personal
Municipal Debt Tax Rates Tax Rates
Equilibrium
Model ShortLong Short Long ShortLong
Bank
Arijit rage
Model None None + + NoneNone
Miller
Model I
(Te =0) None None + + None* None*
Miller
Model II
(Te*O) + + + + + +
Preferred
Habitat
Model None + + None +
Notes: *Some personal tax changes could have an effect by eliminating thepro- visions of the tax code which MillerandScholes (1978) argue permit
investors to reduce their equity tax burden to zero.Rm
rm
R(-r)










Thecompeting views of the municipal market canbetested by exa-
mining the reaction of long— and short—term yield spreads to changes in expec-
tations about tax policy. Changes in current corporate tax rates should affect
short—term yield spreads under all views. Miller Model II and the preferred
habitat theorysuggestthat movements in expected personal tax rates should show
upin long—term yielddifferentials, while the bank arbitrage model and Miller
ModelI suggestthat only changes in future corporate rates should affect long—
term yields. This section describes myprocedure for analyzing the impact of
expectedtax changes on yield spreads.
3.1 Asset Pricing Framework
Inequilibrium, newly—issued T period bonds with a par value of




where p is the nominal after—tax discount rate &pplied to the bond's income






whereC is the taxablecoupon andis the expected marginal tax rate of
the marginal holder of this bond in period J. This tax rate could change
over the life of the bond in either of two ways. The tax code mightchange,
alteringU for the bond's initial owner, or the owner of the bond might change,—23—
as when a household purchases a long term new issue bond andsells itto a
bankwhenits remaining maturity iffiveyears. For bonds which are sold at par,
the yieldto maturity (y) equals the coupon rate, so yt =Cand m =Cm.
The asset pricing equations can be linearized, following standard
procedures from term—structure studies, to calculate the effect of a tax change
on each bond's yield to maturity. My analysis assumes that the discount rate,
p, is unaffected by the tax change. This is an oversimplification, since major
reforms in either the corporate or personaltax system are likely to affect the
after—taxreturn available to investors.11 The yield to maturity on a tax—exempt
bond must equal p, so by assumption the tax change will have no effect on the
required municipal coupon rate. Changes in expected tax rates will, however,
affect the required coupon on taxable bonds selling at par. By differen-
tiating (i), we find
(8) --—= = (l+p)_iCt =w e e T j dO dO. —k e
i 3 L (1+p) (1_ok)
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The implied tax rate computed by comparing taxable and tax exempt




Changes in the implied tax rate can be linked to changes in expected future—2)4—







In the special case of a consol, the expression for dO' becomes
(13) d&: =p(1+PrdO
j =0
which is just a discounted sum of changes in expected futuretax rates.
The change in the implied tax rate can also be written in terms of
holding period returns on taxable and tax—exempt bonds. In the fixed discount
rate case, the price of a taxable consol is =l/yand the expression for
01 becomes
m t y P I (1)4) 0 =t m
YOD
Thereforethe change in the implied tax rate is proportional to the return




wheredP/P is the holding period return. If the discountratewere allowed
to va, dO would be propoiona1 to the difference in the holdingperiod—25—
returns onmunicipaland taxable consols.
If it were possible to obtain reliable estimates of'{do}1,
then
(11)would provide a basis for empirical investigation. We could estimate
regression models of the form
(16) =+ ozjeI
+
totest whether changes in expected personal or corporate tax rates altered the
yield spreads on taxable and tax exempt bonds. Alternative measures of
could be constructed from forecasts of the future course of personal, and
corporate, tax policy. Evidence that changes in expected personal tax rates
influenced the taxable—tax exempt yield spread would contradictthe bank
arbitragemodel andMiller Model I.
The dependent variable in equation (16) is readily observable; it
is the change in the implied tax rate between two periods. Unfortunately,
the independent variable depends upon the path of tax expectations over a
long horizon. These are difficult, if not impossible, to measure. Several
problems are particularly acute. First, it isnecessary to distinguish between
permanentand temporary tax reforms.Transitory tax changes will have smaller
effects on long—term yields than permanent changes, and it is therefore
essential to specify the horizon over which investors expect tax reforms to
persist. Second, the marginal tax rates which determine 01 may depend on both
the tax code and the distribution of wealth by tax brackets. Changes in the
highest marginal personal tax rates, without any movement in lower bracket rates-26-
or in the distribution of wealth, might have no effect on the yield spread.
Forecasting the distribution of wealth across tax rates is also rather dif-
ficult. A final problem in constructing is predicting the debt supply
behavior of municipal governments. A smaller yield spread between taxable and
tax—exempt yields, possibly induced by tax reform, might reduce the total
amount of municipal debt marketed by states and localities. In some models
this could change the tax rate of the marginal investor. Since there is at
present little evidence on how municipal debt supply responds to interest
rates, these predictions would again be subject to great uncertainty.
T
Rather than trying to construct a measure of z tOe for each month,
j=oj i
this paper adopts a simpler but less powerful testing strategy. By examining
news accounts of tax policy debates, it is possible to identify months when
investors should have revised their expectations of future tax rates. These
months can be classified into those in which there would have most likely been
positive and negative revisions. Indicator variables for these months are
then included in regression models for the movements in implied tax rates at
variousmaturities. If changes in expected fttre personal tax rates do
affect the yield spread, then these indicator variables should have signifi-
cant effectsand their signs should accord with the direction of movement in
tax expectations.
The principal empirical difficulty which arises in implementing this
procedure is deciding what tax expectations were before news arrived. The
passage of a tax bill raising interest income tax rates might increase
expected future tax rates. However, if investors expected the increase in tax—27—
rates to be larger than those which were actually approved, then the final
passage of a higher—taxes bill might in fact reduce expected future tax rates.
There is no easy way to resolve problems of this type, and the results pre-
sented below should therefore be interpreted with some caution. The remainder
of this section describes how tax policy "events" were identified and their
effects on expectations were assessed. It then discusses the econometric spe-
cification of xmj estimating equations.
3.2 Data Description: Tax Policy Events
To identify tax policy events during the last thirty years, I searched
through the annual indices to the New York Times and read the sections on
Federal Income Taxation and Government Bonds. My first reading was confined to
items which appeared in bold—faced type. Whenever a potentially significant tax
policy announcement was encountered, I searched backward in time to see if pre-
vious nnths had contained similar, but less highly publicized, information. My
search revealed numerous events which could have changed expectations of tax
rates, and it was necessary to nnke subjective judgements about which ones to
investigate further. I pursued those which seemed most important by examining
the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report for each year to look for related
events which might not have been reported in the New York Times.The resulting
series of monthly tax events should provide a rough chronolor of times when tax
policy was expected to change.
The set of tax events which I considered most significant, along with







Month Tax Policy Event Model I Model II
May 1959 Rep. Wilbur Mills proposes to hold
hearings to broaden the tax bose —
•May—June 1962 Treasury Secretary Dillon and Presid-
ent Kennedy advocate reductions in
tax rateB, especially at top rates 0 —
September1962 Keogh—Smathers bill signed into law
allowingself—employed individuals to
maintain tax—favored retirement plans 0 —
January1963 President Kennedy proposes tax cut in
State of the Union Message — —
January19611 President Johnson asks Congress for
urgent action to pass tax cut proposal
February 19611 Tax cutpassesCongress andis signed
into law;top marginal tax rates
reduced from 91% to 70%
January1967 President Johnson asks for a tax
surcharge to stem inflation and
financeVietnam War + +
May1968 Surtax plan passes Congress + +
° June1968 Final passage of surtax plan + +
* March1969 Several mambers of houseWaysandMeans
Committee announce intention of chang-
ing the taxation of municipal interest
*July1969 House Waysand MeansCommittee passes
minimum tax provision including muni-
cipal interest in tax base
*September1969Senator Russell Long andFinance
Committee mambers express opposition
toHousetreatment of tax—exempt int-
erest in minimum tax provision + +
December1969 Passage of 1969 Tax Act with surtax
extended for part of1970 + +
July197i HouseWays andMeansCommittee passes
bill reducingtop marginal tax rate on
unearned income to 50% 0
January1978 Carter proposes tax reforms whichwould
raisetax rates on high—income groups 0 +
* June1980 At a major press conference, candidate
Reagan explains his 30% tax reduction
plan with across—the—board tax cuts. 0
• November 1980 ElectIon of Ronald Reagan raises the
probability of major tax reductions 0 —
* December1980 IRS rules that commercial banks may not
deduct interestexpenses on borrowing
used for holding municipal debt C—) 0
°January1981 IRS reverses ruling on bank tax treat-
ment regarding municipal interest (a) 0
*February1981 Reagan proposes tax cut 0
• August 1981 Tax cut passes with provisions for IRAs,
Keoghs, arid All—Savers certificates, 0
reduces maximum marginal tax rate on
unearned income to 50%
*August1982 TEFRA restricts access to tas—deferred
savings vehicles, changes Interest de-
duction rules on banks,makesmunIcipal interest subJecttotax for some Social
Security recipients (a) +
Notes:These tax eventswereidentified by scanningthepasesof the lewYork
Times Index and the Coneresnional QuarterlyWeekly Penort. Events
lahelled with as asterisk are those which were consideredto be most significant in theIr effects ontaxex;ectatlons.The eventsit December 1980, January1981, andAoust lull have aseffect urder Miller
ModelI.but, have the ffe-t "———28—
characterand importance. Some are proposed IRSrulingson the tax treatment of
municipal interestpayments, others are developments during Congressional deba-
tes, and still others are announcements of plans for far—reaching changes in the
tax structure. The events which I consider to be of the greatest significance
with respect to tax expectations are identified with an asterisk; they are the
principal events which I analyze in the next section. However, further results
involving all of the tax events are reported in the Appendix.
The important tax events divide into five major groups: those
surrounding the Kennedy—Johnson tax cut, the Vietnam War tax surcharge, the
1969 Tax Reform Act's proposed changes in the tax treatment of municipal
interest, the Reagan tax cut, and several changes in the tax treatment of
banks. While it is difficult to obtain information on the relative importance
of the different tax events, a brief account of each is provided below.
The 196)4 Tax Cut had been discussed by officials in the Kennedy
administration beginning in 1962 and was proposed in the 1963 State of the
Union speech. It reduced the top marginal tax rate on individuals from 91% to
70%, although its effect on tax rates below the maximum was less dramatic.
The weighted average marginal dividend tax rate series computed by Estrella
and Fuhrer (1983) declined by 6.5 percentage points between 1963 and 1965.
The 1964 Act also lowered corporate tax rates from 52 percent to 1-i8 percent
over a two—year period. Both Miller models as well as the bank arbitrage view
therefore predict that these changes should have affected the relative pricing
of taxable and tax—exempt debt.
President Johnson's Vietnam war surtax was first proposed in January-29-
1967, but it did not receive Congressional approval until June 1968. There was
a five percent surtax on both corporate and individual income tax liability in
1968, a ten percent surtax in 1969, and a 2.5 percent surtax in 1970. I focus
principally on the proposal of the surtax in 1967, and its effect on tax
expectations. Okun (1971), in his study of consumption responses to the sur-
tax, argues that "influenced in part by the history of the Korean war 'tem-
porary' taxation, American citizens typically were skeptical that the tax
surcharge would actually expire in a short time (p.178)."Thissuggests that
the surtax may have had larger effects than would ordinarily be associated
with a three—year tax increase. Since the surtax altered both individual and
corporate tax rates, it is again difficult to distinguish between the dif-
ferent ndels using this tax reform.
The third set of tax events which impinge upon municipal bond yields
involve the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Early in 1969, several members of the
House Ways and Means Committee indicated informally their intention of reforming
the tax treatment of municipal interest payments. The Treasury Department pro-
posed a plan for a minimum tax, which included interest on municipal bonds in
the definition of income subject to minimum tax. The Ways and Means Committee
passed legislation to this effect in July, and revised tax treatment of munici-
pal interest seemed likely until September when Senate hearings began and
Senator Russell Long and members of the Senate Finance Committee made their
intention of preserving tax—exempt interest well known. The popular wisdom at
the time held that the escalation of municipal interest rates was principally
due to the tax reforms. The New York Times, in a September 1969 article,
concluded that:—30—
Some of the [increase in municipal interest rates]
has been caused by the general tightness in the nney
and capital nrkets...More of the increase,however,
appears to result from investor worries over the pos-
sibility that municipal bonds won't carry a tax advan-
tage as attractive as they do now. Tax reform legislat-
ion has significantly undermined the traditional
method for financing state and local capital needs.
[September T, 1969, p.111—12.]
While the immediate prospect for tax reform declined after the final provi-
sions of the 1969 Act became clear, there were still discussions of some
reform plans for some time afterward.
The 1969 reform discussion is important because it did not propose any
changes in corporate tax rates.The minimum tax was to be applied to
duals, not firms, and corporate tax rates were largely unaffected by the Tax
Reform Act. If the Miller Model I or the bank arbitrage hypothesis is
correct, then there should be no change in the implied tax rates on municipal
bonds as a result of the tax proposals. Miller Model II andthe"preferred
habitat" model, however, would both predict substantial movements in interest
rate spreads as a result of these changes.
The next major tax change is President Reagan's tax cut of 1981.
Ronald Reagan had discussed tax reform during the election campaign of 1980,
and in a June press conference he made clear that if elected he would introduce
across—the—board cuts in marginal personal tax rates. The news media at the
time reached the conclusion that regardless of the election's outcome, some type
of significant tax reduction would be likely. The final tax bill reduced the
highest marginal tax rate on unearned income from 10 percent to 50 percent and—31—
instituted a tax reform plan which would reduce tax rates by twenty—six percent
over three years. Twoofthe most important 1981 tax developments, from the
standpoint of the municipal bond market, did not occur until near the time of
the tax bill's passage. These changes were the extension of the IRA eligibility
to individuals enrolled in private pension plans, and the one—year All—Savers
program. The former altered the long—run prospects for the attractiveness of
municipal bonds as a source of tax sheltered income. The latter drew short—term
money from municipal bond funds into savings institutions. The importance of
these events led me to focus on August 1981 in imjanalysisof the 1981 tax
cut.12
The 1981 tax changes were also directed primarily at the individual
tax rate, and they did not substantially affect the marginal tax rates facing
firms. Both the bank arbitrage model and the Miller Model I would predict no
effects from the 1981 reforms, while the Miller Model II and the Preferred
Habitat model would predict substantial movements in implied tax rates.
The final set of tax events concern the tax treatment of banks. The
first occured in December 1980, when the IRS issued Revenue Procedure 80—55,
which stated that banks would henceforth be unable to deduct interest paid on
govermental time deposits which were collateralized bytaxexempt securities.
If implemented, this rule would have substantially reduced the attractiveness
of holding municipal debt for commercial banks (see Madeo and Pincus (1982)).
The rule was subsequently reversed in January 1981 after the Reagan
Administration took office. These two months should be characterized by
changesin short term yield spreads under all views, and long—term responses—32—
underthe Preferred Habitat model and the bank arbitrage hypothesis. In both
Miller models, corporate financial adjustments determine the equilibrium pat-
tern of bond prices, so the tax treatment of banks is irrelevant. A less
important event affecting the attractiveness of bank participation in the
municipal market occurred with the passage of TEFRAin1982, when banks were
restricted to deducting only 85 percent of their interest payments on
borrowing used to hold municipal bonds.
Determining the magnitude and direction of expectational changes is
not the only problem with an "event" study of this type. We also must rrasure
when expectations changed. The equations which are reported in the next sec-
tion all assume that expectations change during the month which I have
labelled as "the tax event." An alternative approach would recognize that in
many cases information builds gradually over time. This could be implemented
bydefiningindicator variables for the month labelled as the tax event and
eitherthe month before or the month afterwards. I experimented with these
different approaches, and found that the qualitative character of myresults
wasunaffected by them.
3.3 Econometric Specification
The previous two sub—sections have described how tax events affect the
municipal yield spread. However, to provide reliable evidence on whether or not
tax changes affect municipal yields we must control for a variety of other fac-
tors which also induce movements in the yield spread. The relative riskiness of
taxable and tax—exempt debt is the most important such factor.Table 5: Events Affecting Municipal Bond Risk
Predicted Effect on
Month Risk Event Implied Tax Rate
January 1970 President Nixon announces plan for
Revenue Sharing in State of Union
address +
November! Expansion of size of proposed Reven-
December 1970 ue Sharing plans (REVSHARE) +
March1972 House Ways and Means Committee approves
Revenue Sharing bill +
November! First indications Qf financial distress
December l971 by New York City (NYC1)
September 1975 Height of New York City financial crisis
(NYc2)
June 1978 Passage of Proposition 13 in California
March—May 1983 Rising concern over impact of WFPSS default
and Washington State Supreme Court ruling
absolving utilities of liability (wpss)
Notes: These events were identified by examining the New York Times Index sec-
tions for Government Bonds. A more complete discussion of the two New
York events may be found in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (1976) and Hoffland (1977). The names in parentheses are used
to describe these vaiables in subsequent tables which report regression
results.—33—
Two techniques are used in controlling for changing risk. First, just
as in the case of tax policy events, the New York Times Index was scanned for
evidence of important events which would have affected the perceived riskiness
of municipal securities. These events, which are detailed in Table 5, included
the New York City financial crisis of l974—5 and the passage of Proposition 13
in 1978. For each risk event, an indicator variable was defined and included in
the regression for changes in the implied tax rates. Increases in municipal
riskiness should reduce I, since higher tax exempt interest rates would be
demanded by investors. Many of the risk events proved insignificant when
added to the regression equations, and they are not reported in the tables in
the next section.
The relative riskiness of municipal securities also depends on other
factors such as the econortr's position in the business cycle and the share of
state and local revenues provided through federal revenue sharing. The change
in the unemployment rate, &JNEMPR, and the change in the share of federal grants
in state and local expenditures, FEDGRANT, were therefore included in some
specifications. To allow for any systematic changes in the composition or
riskiness of tax—exempt debt issued at different nments in the calendar year,
I also included a set of monthly dumn variables in the regression equations.
January was the only month which ever showed a substantial or significant
coefficient, and since there are other anomalies of security behavior that are
known to occur in January, I retained the January variable but left all other
monthly variables out of the final specification.13
The equations in the next section also include two other variables.—34—
The first, SLSHARE, is the change in the fraction of total outstanding credit
market debt which is accounted for by state and local obligations. In Miller
Model I and the bank arbitrage model, the quantity of state and local debt
outstanding should have no impact on the implied tax rate, because offsetting
changes should occur in corporate capital structures. In Miller Model II and
the Preferred Habitat model there could be an effect on the implied tax rate.
The variable SLSHARE is included as a test of these predictions.
The final variable which I include is (VOLATILITy), the change in an
estimate of interest rate volatility. This is measured as the change in a
36—month rolling estimate of the variance of tax exempt interest rates at the
maturity of the implied tax rate. It is designed to capture the changing value
of the "tax trading" options on taxable and tax—exempt bonds.
The basic equation which I estimated for one, five, ten, and twenty
year maturity bonds is:
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The set of variables RISK1t are indicator variables for risk events, andTAXkt
areindicators for tax policy changes.
Before considering the results, two estimation issues should be men-
tioned. First, the data on yields to maturity are sometimes subject to errors of
measurement. Salomon Brothers estimates the yield which would be required on a
T year bond selling at par. The estimates are based on ayield curvecalculated
from actual bond sales. For niunicipals, which are typically sold in blocks—35—
including bonds of varying maturities, the yield curve may give slightly erro-
neous estimates for some yields. Since the dependent variable in (17) depends
on the difference in yields in two consecutive months, errors in the yield data
will induce a moving average error. The reported equations were all corrected
for MA(i) errors using a maximum—likelihood procedure.
Second, the residuals from OLS estimation of (17) were clearly
heteroscedastic over time. To allow for changing error variances, the
sample was divided into twelve subsamples of equal length, 29 months, and the
error variance was assumed to be constant within each of these months but
allowed to vary between them. The White Test reported in each column of the
tables is a test (White (1980)) against heteroscedasticity of this form; it
always allows us to reject the null of homoscedasticity. The reported equations
were estimated using a feasible GLS procedure.h'4—36—
.RegressionResults
This section reports the results of analyzing the movements in implied
tax rates for short and long term bonds during the months of major tax policy
changes. Table 6a reports results for bonds with maturities of ten and twenty
years. Results for five and one year bonds are reported in Table 6b. This
section first analyzes which tax events appear to have affected the bond market
substantially, and then returns to the question of which equilibrium model these
results support. The tax policy events are discussed in chronological order,
focusing on those events which were marked with an asterisk in Table 1. Full
sets of regression results for all tax and risk events are reported in the
Appendix.
4.l Tax Policy Events
The initial discussions of a tax cut in 1962 seem to have induced
little movement in the taxable—tax exempt yield spread. When President Kennedy
asked for the tax cut in his State of the Union address in January 1963,
however, there was a coincident decline in the implied long—term marginal tax
rate of nearly four percentage points. This is evident in the implied tax rates
on five, ten and twenty year bonds. By comparison, the yields on one—year bonds
hardly responded to the proposed tax cut; the implied tax rate on one year
bonds changed by less than one percentage point. This suggests that the Tiurket
reacted to changing expectations about the long-run course of tax policy, but
recognized that due to implementation lags reforms were not likely to occur
immediately. The magnitudeof the implied tax rate change, four percentageTable 6a: Changes in Implitit Tax Rates on Lone—Maturity Bonds
TwentyYear Maturity
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 ______________
Conatant —0.13 —0.21 —0.21
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
May/June62 —1.02 —1.00 —1.01
(0.92) (0.93) (0.93)
Jan63 —3.89 —3.24 —3.21
(1.36) (1.38) (1.38)
Jan 67 4.44 4.62 4.65
(1.29) (1.32) (1.32)
June 68 0.23 0.28 0.27
(2.48) (2.I2) (2.42)
Mar69 —4.74 —4.50 —4.49
(2.48) (2.43) (2.42)
July69 —6.25 —6.64 —6.60
(3.86) (3.86) (3.84)
Sept 69 12.88 12.39 12.44
(3.86) (3.86) (3.85)
June 80 —4.08 —3.30 —3.11
(1.86) (1.84) (1.86)
Nov 80 0.11 —0.60 —0.36
(1.86) (1.84) (1.87)
Dec 80 —3.61 —3.45 —3.26
(1.86) (1.85) (1.88)
Jan 81 —0.42 —0.93 —0.76
(1.90) (1.88) (1.92)
Feb 81 0.58 0.16 0.35
(1.86) (1.84) (1.88)
Aug 81 —6.62 —6.73 —6.24
(3.29) (3.16) (3.14)
Aug 82 3.71 4.38 4.04
(3.29) (3.16) (3.15)
REVS}iARE 3.99 4.16 4.77
(2.73) (2.74) (2.73)
NYC1 —8.40 —6.51 —6.65
(3.82) (3.80) (3.80)
NYC2 —3.75 —3.87 —3.82
(2.70) (2.61) (2.61)
WPPSS —0.81 —0.50 —0.74
(1.90) (1.84) (1.83)
JA1flJAY 2.04 2.10 2.10
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
&JNER — —1.45 —1.34
(0.61) (0.62)
SHARESL — —7.27 —7.57
(3.79) (3.81)
dFERANT — —0.11 —0.13
(0.34) (0.35)
V0LATILITY — — —1.34
(1.98)

































































Note: All equations are estimated for the period 1955:1—1953:12. a total of348
monthlyobservations. Equations areestimated allowing forafirst—order ving
average error structure, withMA parameter8,with acorrection forheterosce—
dasticity. Standarderrorsareshom in parentheses.Table 6b: Changes in Implicit Tax Ratei on Short—Maturity honda
Five—Year Maturity













































































































































Note: All equationsare estimatedfor the period 1955:1—1983:12, a total of 35
onth1y observations. Equations areestimated a1lowin for a first—order cuvln5
averageerror structure, with MA parameter 5, with a correct ion for beterosce—
dasticity.Standarderrorsare shown in parenthese,.—37--
points, is close to the proposed change in corporate tax rates and somewhat
smaller than the change in measures of personal tax burden such as weighted
average dividend or interest income tax rates. Since the tax bill proposed by
President Kennedy reduced both personal and corporate tax rates, all of the
equilibrium models proposed in Section Two predict movements in implied tax
rates. The finding that bond prices adjusted supports the notion that tax
expectations affect the yield spread, but does not help distinguish between
the competing views.
The bond price effects of the initial announcement of President
Johnson's surtax plan are also pronounced. In January 1967 the implied long
term tax rate rose by over four percent. This coefficient is statistically
significant at all standard levels. President Johnson's proposed surtax, in
spite of its explicitly temporary nature, had as large an impact on the yield
spread as the announced l963—)4 tax cut; this is somewhat puzzling. It may
suggest that taxpayers perceived the far—reaching Kennedy reforms to be no more
than a transitory event, or that they suspected that the surtax might last for a
long while. The short—term municipal market also reacted to the tax cut plan,
again by "too much" to be explained by tax expectations alone. The implied tax
rate on one year bonds rose by more than ten percentage points in January 1967.
This may reflect the expectation of bondholders that a large tax increase
would be enacted swiftly, as part of an emergency war finance program. Even
if it were expected to passimmediately,however, the magnitude of the short—
term yield effect is larger than can plausibly be attributed to taxes alone.
Like the l96}4 change, the 1967 reform affected both personal and corporate tax—38—
rates and it therefore haslittlepower for distinguishing between the dif-
ferent models of municipal yield determination.
The tax reform discussions of 1969 provide more convincing evidence
that personal tax changes affect yield spreads in the tax—exempt bond market.
The initial proposals for changing the tax status of municipal interest, in
March 1969, coincided with sharp declines in the implied tax rates in all
markets. The tax rate computed from twenty year bonds fell by four and one
half percentage points, while that on ten year bonds fell by three percent.
Short bonds also responded dramatically, with the tax rate changing by almost
six percentage points.1-5 The subsequent action by the Ways and Means Committee
in July 1969 had a pronounced effect on the long term market, inducing between
five and seven point reductions in the long—term implied tax rate, but vir-
tually no impact on one—year implied tax rates. In the short term market, the
implied tax rate actually rose by two percentage points during that month.
The turnabout in expectations which occurred in September 1969 once again
caused dramatic effects in the long—term bond market but only small movements
in short—term yields. The implied tax rate on twenty—year municipal bonds
rose by twelve percentage points in September; that on ten—year securities
jumped nearly ten percent. By comparison, short—term implied tax rates rose
by only four percent.
Unlike the previous tax events, the 1969 legislative developments
can help to resolve the differences between the competing models of municipal
market equilibrium. All of the proposals to implement a minimum tax focused
only on changing the personal tax code. In both the Bank Arbitrage Model and—39—
Miller Model I, these proposals should have had no effect on the relative
yields on taxable and tax—exempt debt. The finding of major changes in long—
term yields coincident with these tax developments suggests that Miller Model
II or the Preferred Habitat model may provide a better explanation of long—
term yield determination than either of the models which focus on the cor-
porate tax rate.
The fourth major tax reform, the Reagan tax cut of 1980—81, also seems
to have affected the yield spread between taxable and tax—exempt debt.
However, relatively few of the events which I identified prior to the passage
of ERTA in 1981 had substantial effects. In June 1980, for example, when can-
didate Reagan announced his tax reform plans at a press conference, the
implied tax rate on twenty—year municipal bonds declined by nearly four per-
centage points. This could be attributed to tax expectations; however, this
explanation is weakened by the finding that neither five nor ten—year implied
tax rates declined during that month. Similarly, the effect of Reagan's elec-
toral victory in November 1980 is weak. The signs of the coefficients on
long—term implied tax rates are mixed, and none of the coefficients is close
to statistically significant. The Reagan budget proposal in February 1981
evoked a similarly small response from the long—term bond market; most of the
estimated coefficients are positive, not negative, as would be predicted by
either of the models which focus on personal taxes. These insignificant
results during three periods when tax expectations may have changed constitute
some support for the Bank Arbitrage Model and Miller Model I. Alternatively,
they may show that bond market participants considered passage of a tax reformplan unlikely until President Reagan's stunning victory in the House at the
end of July 1981.
Support for the importance of personal tax variables comes from the
coefficients on the August 1981 indicator for the passage of ERTA. All of the
long—term implied tax rates decline substantially, with twenty—year bonds
showing a drop of six percentage points in the value of Smaller, but sta-
tistically significant, effects are recorded on the other long—term implied
tax rates. Like the 1969 discussions of minimum tax, most of the provisions
of the 1981 bill were directed at personal, not corporate, tax reform. The
bill cut the top marginal tax rate on unearned income from seventy to fifty
percent and also extended access to tax—exempt saving vehicles. The finding
that municipal bond yields changed therefore provides some evidence for Miller
Model II and the Preferred Habitat view. Short—term yields also rose substan-
tially during August 1981, reducing the implied tax rate. This was probably
due to the introduction of one—year All Savers certificates, which drew funds
away from commercial banks and money market mutual funds and into savings and
loan institutions. This reduced commercial banks' demand for tax—exempt
bonds.
The final tax events concern the tax treatment of banks. The tax
event in December 1980 is the proposed IRS ruling to disallow interest deduc'—
tions for bank loans which were collateralized with municipal securities.
Under the bank arbitrage hypothesis, this development should have substan-
tially lowered the implied tax rate in both long and short—term markets, since
it ended the attractiveness of this form of tax—exempt income for many hank.- 1-
Under both Miller Models this change should have had no effect, and under the
Preferred Habitat model, the change should have affected only short term
yields. The evidence suggests a pronounced effect on the one—year implied tax
rate, a change of between six and seven percentage points, as well as small
butstatistically less significant effects on longer—term implied tax rates.
When the change was rescinded in January 1981, however, only the short—term
yield spread responded in any significant fashion. This suggests that bank
participation in the municipal market is a more significant force in setting
short than long term bond prices.
The evidence from the passage of TEFRA in August 1982, while more
difficult to interpret, also suggests a role for banks. The 1982 law reduced
the share of interest payments which banks could deduct on loans used to hold
municipal bonds from 100 percent to 85 percent, lowering the attractiveness of
holding municipal debt. Coincident with the law's passage is a widening of
the yield spread between taxable and tax—exempt debt. The difficulty in
interpretation arises because the law also instituted other changes which
might have affected non—bank investors' demand for rnunicipals. The law effec-
tively taxed some Social Security recipients on municipal interest and
placed restrictions on future issues of Industrial Revenue Bonds. This could
have raised the expected future marginal tax rate on municipal interest and
thereby raised the implied tax rate calculated on long term bonds. These
developments seem to support the importance of banks, especially at short
maturities, in determining the yield spread.
The results in this section are summarized in Table 7. They do notTable 7:Summary of Empirical Findings
Predictionsof Model for Implied Tax Rate:
Bank Preferred
Arbitrage Miller Miller Habitat
Tax Change Model Model I Model II Model Observed
1962/3 Tax Cut
Proposal
—ShortTerm + + + + 0
-.LongTerm + + + + +
1967/8Surtax
—Short Term + + + + +
—LongTerm + + + +
1969Tax Act
Hearings
—ShortTerm 0 0 + 0 +
—LongTerm 0 0 + + 4
1981 Tax Cut
—ShortTerm ? + +
—LongTerm 0 0 + + 4
Changesin Bank
Taxation
—ShortTerm + 4 + + +
—LongTerm + + + 0 4
Source: Results reported in Tables 6a and 6b and discussed in the text.provide universal support for any single theory of how municipal interest rates
are determined. However, the evidence from the 1969 Tax Reform hearings and the
passage of ERTA in 1981 supports either Miller Model II or the Preferred
Habitat hypothesis at long maturities. The absence of strong reactions to
events during the 1980 election campaign and the subsequent introduction of
the tax bill supports the two views which regard personal taxes as irrelevant.
The dramatic reaction in December 1980 to the changed IRS ruling on commercial
bank deductability of taxable interest payments, especially at short maturi-
ties, supports the bank arbftrage and Preferred Habitat views. The Preferred
Habitat model therefore receives the most widespread support in the data.16
The results on tax changes and long—term yield spreads can provide
some information on the source of recent changes in the yield spread between
taxable and tax—free securities. The implied tax rate on long—term bonds
declined by over twenty percentage points between 1980 and 1982. Adding up the
five coefficients on the tax events during the 1980—1981 period suggests a total
tax—related effect of about eight percentage points, between one—third and one—
half of the total. This calculation is based on twenty year bonds; analysis of
five year bonds suggests that 19 percent of the decline may be attributable to
taxes, while for ten year bonds the point estimate is 24.5 percent of the
change. These estimates are probably lower bounds for the true effect of taxes
on yield spreads, since they neglect all of the changes which may have taken
place between my "event months". Nonetheless, they suggest a significant
influence of tax policy on the relative yields on taxable and tax—exempt debt.
Before examining the results for other variables included in the spe——4 3—
cif'ications, two important caveats should be noted. First, irrj event variables
may have dated incorrectly the points at which expectations of market par-
ticipants changed. This should bias my results on tax policy effects toward
zero. Secondly, however, the low power of the event—study approach and its
susceptibility to spurious factors aist be emphasized. I have surely not
controlled for all of the non—tax influences on the tax—exempt bond market,
and the results should therefore be interpreted with some caution.
4.2 Other Explanatory Factors
Adding variables designed to measure changes in relative riskiness
over time, such as the change in the unemployment rate, did not change the
conclusions about tax policy at all. The estimated coefficients for the tax
event months change slightly between the three different specifications which
are reported for each maturity in Tables 6a and 6b, but they always suggest
the same conclusions. The coefficients on the change in the unemployment rate
indicate that an increase in unemployment reduces the implied tax rate on
long—term bonds. If the unemployment rate rose by one percentage point during
a one month period, this would induce between a one and two percentage point
reduction on the implied tax rate for long—term bonds. This is consistent
with the standard notion that Treasury securities are riskiess but that the
preceived default probability on municipal bonds, even highest grade munici—
pals, rises during economic downturns. This effect seems unimportant for
short—maturity debt, where the coefficient on &JNEMPR is positive but sta-
tistically insignificant. The other variable which controls for risk, the—414—
share of state and local revenues financed through federal grants, proved
insignificant in all of the estimated equations. Experiments with other risk
measures, such as the yield spread between BAA and AA.A corporate bonds or good
and prime rated niunicipals, produced similarly insignificant results.
The indicator variables designed to measure risk events generally had
their predicted signs, but most were statistically insignificant. The variable
for the expansion of revenue sharing suggested a one percentage point reduction
in the implied tax rate due to risk reduction. Both of the New York City indica-
tor variables have statistically insignificant effects; this is not surprising
given Hoffland's (1977) report that nest of the municipal market jitters engen-
dered by the New York City crisis affected state and local bonds in lower rating
classes. The WPPSS default in early 1983 also had some effect on the implied
yield spread, inducing a large (two point) but statistically insignificant
reduction in the implied tax rate. Again this is not unexpected since most of
the effect of the WPPSS default was on revenue bonds, not the general obligation
securities used to construct my implied tax rates.
The volatility variable which was inc]uded to capture changes in
tax—timing values had a negative sign in all of the estimated equations. The
hypothesis that it has no effect is often impossible to reject, however, and
the pattern of coefficients across different maturities is also surprising.
The volatility effect through the tax—timing option should be smallest for
short maturity bonds, but the coefficient on the volatility variable is larger
for short than for long—maturity implied tax rates. Large standard errors
makeinferencesabout these coefficients difficult, however._'4 5
Thefinal variable which I included, the "supply effect" measure of
the share of state and local debt in the outstanding stock of credit market
debt, has a significant or nearly—significant negative coefficient in nearly all
of the estimated equations. This suggests that increases in the outstanding
stock of iminicipals will lower the implied tax rate between taxable and tax
exempt bonds, providing strong evidence against both the Bank Arbitrage Model
and Miller Model I, both of which predict the irrelevance of relative supplies.
A one percentage point increase in the quantity of municipal debt would be
predicted to reduce implied tax rate on twenty—year bonds by approximately 4.7
percentage points. The estimated effects of the same change for other maturi-
ties vary between three and seven percentage points. These results are con-
sistent with the Preferred Habitat model and Miller Model II, both of which
allow changes in the stock of municipal debt to change the tax rate of the
marginal holder of municipal bonds. Unfortunately, the lack of data on the
outstanding stock of debt at different maturities precluded testing more pre-
cise hypotheses, such as whether larger issues of short term debt depress the
short—term implied tax rate. Further tests of whether the outstanding stock
of municipal debt and the composition of investors holding municipal debt
affect the yield spread are reported in Poterba (l981).—6—
5. Conclusions
This paper provides evidence that the yield spreads between long
term taxable and tax exempt bonds respond to changes in expected future tax
rates. The finding that changes in expected tax rates on individual Investors
alter the yield spread casts doubt on some of the theories of municipal bond
pricing which have been advanced in recent years. It supports the conclusion
that the municipal market is segmented, with different Investor clienteles at
short and long maturities.
These results shed some light on the likely effects of two proposed
changes in municipal borrowing practices. The first reform calls for increased
state and local use of short—term borrowing with a concommitant reduction in
long—term bond issues.'7 This proposal is motivated by the upward—sloping nomi-
nal term structure of tax—exempt interest rates. In 1983, for example, the
average yield on one year prime municipal bonds wasonly sixtypercent of that
on twenty year bonds. Short—term tax—exempt rates were also lower relative to
comparable taxable rates. In spite of this interest rate differential, only
thirty one percent of municipal borrowing in 1983 was at maturities of less than
one year, and less than six percent of the outstanding stock of state and local
debt was short—term.
The potential savings from increased short—term borrowing depend
crucially upon the causes of the recent increase in, and generally elevated
level of, long—term tax—exempt interest rates. If long—term yields are high
because of risk, which would be the explanation of the upward—sloping term
structure in either the Bank Arbitrage Model or Miller Model I, then heavier147 —
useof short—term debt would yield little reduction in borrowing costs over
the life of state and local capital projects. However, the Preferred Habitat
theory suggests that some savings might occur. If yield differentials are due
partly to different tax rates facing investors in different market segments,
then increased short term borrowing could reduce borrowing costs. The fin-
dings in this paper provide some support for this view. Further research is
needed to disentangle the contributions of risk, tax expectations, and other
factors to the shape of the tax exempt term structure, and to provide estimates
of the expected savings from increased short—term borrowing.
A second reform proposal is the so—called "taxable bond option," which
would allow states and localities the option of issuing taxable debt while
receiving a subsidy, equal to a fixed fraction of the bond issue, from the
federal government.18 Fama (1971) argued that this proposal would not be suc-
cessful unless the subsidy rate equalled the corporate tax rate, since all
deviations from RM =(l—t)Rare due to risk. The results in this paper,
however, cast doubt on this conclusion. In either a Preferred Habitat or Miller
Model II scenario, states and localities might choose to issue taxable debt at
subsidy rates substantially below the corporate tax rate. Unfortunately, the
estimates here do not provide direct measures of the required subsidy level.
These results also inform the debate on corporate capital structure
and what determines debt—equity ratios. Evidence on the relative prices of
taxable and tax—exempt debt contradicts the frequent assumption that the effec-
tive tax rate on equity income equals zero. In the capital structure model
advanced by Merton Miller (1977), nonzero equity tax rates imply that fewinvestors will choose to hold equity rather than corporate debt.'9 The obser-
vation that corporate capital structures are seventy—five percent equity is
therefore difficult to explain in this framework.
This paper raises several important questions for future studies of
municipal finance. First, the municipal debt supply decision has been left
unspecified throughout this analysis. Little is known about how municipal
finance officers choose between issuing debt of different maturities. Second,
I have discussed plans to change real borrowing costs for states and locali-
ties without addressing the normative question of whether such a reduction
should be a goal of public policy.20 States and localities' capital expen-
ditures are twice—subsidized relative to private capital, through both tax—
exempt finance and the income—tax deductability of property taxes. However,
many of the benefits from provision of public capital, such as schools or
roads, accrue to individuals outside the jurisdiction which provides them.
The optimal degree of subsidy vis—a—vis private capital may therefore be
greater than, or less than, that currently provided.Finally, the evidence
presented here suggests that some of the current proposals to reform municipal
financing policies could affect the real cost of public borrowing. Numerical
estimates of these effects are still needed.— 149_
Endnotes
1. Arak and Guentner (1983) discuss several of these explanations.
2. Other recent studies such as Trczinka (1983) and Kimball and Trczinka
(1983) have compared the yields on prime municipals with Aaa—rated corporate
bonds. However, their corporate bond data are only available since 1970, and
that would eliminate many interesting tax changes from the sample period. The
corporate—municipal yield spread is also more sensitive to varying risk dif-
ferentials than the yield spread between Treasury bonds and municipals.
3. Shaefer (1977) discusses several problems which are associated with
yields to maturity in situations when the return on a bond is not proportional
to its coupon payment.
1. Reference to Tables 5 and9in Constantinides and Ingersoll (1983)
suggests that changes in coupon rates and interest rate volatilities, while they
can substantially alter the value of the tax timing option, do not lead to large
changes in the relative values of the options on taxable and tax—exempt bonds.
5. Yawitz, Maloney, and Ederington (1983) estimate default probabilities
for municipal debt of more than one percent per year. This is inconsistent with
the history of municipal defaults, reported for example in ACIR(1976). The
annual default probability on a prime municipal would have to have risen by
almost two percent between 1980 and 1982 to explain the narrowing taxable—tax
exempt yield spread. A newly issued twenty year bond would therefore have had
at least a thirty five percent chance of defaulting during its lifetime; this
seems implausibly large.
6. A discussion of commercial bank behavior may be found in Proctor and
Donahoo (1983).
7. My discussion of municipal debt in the Miller Model draws heavily on
Auerbach and King (1983) and McDonald (1983).A related discussion maybe
found in Buser and Hess (l981).
8. The figure assumes that Te =ym,for some y. This would be the case if
capital gains were untaxed, dividends were taxed at the interest tax rate, and 'r
werethe dividend—payout ratio. Auerbach and King (1983) present a figure siini—
larto my Figure1; anerror in their diagram is corrected in rqy figure.
9.Jensen and Meckling (1976) andBuserand Hess (1981k) discuss the agency
and contracting costs associated with different financial choices.
10. Data on the fraction of tax exempt borrowing at different maturities was
obtained from the "Decade of Municipal Financing't tables published periodically
in the Weekly Bond Buyer.—50—
11.When the discount rate is allowed to change, the conclusion that munici-
pal bond prices remain constant in the face of a tax change would no longer
follow. If there were a fixed world pretax interest rate and the discount rate
equalled (1—rn) times this rate, then taxable bond prices would be unaffected by
tax changes and municipal bond prices would adjust.
12. The passage of Reagan's tax bill in the House occurred on July 29, 1981.
Since the bond market would not have reacted to this news until the thirtieth,
and since the Salomon Brothers data would be for yields reported on the first of
August (ie trades from the thirty—first) there is a substantial risk that the
information associated with the tax cut is not included in the recorded August 1
yield. That is why I focus on the August event for ERTA; that is also the month
during which actual passage occurred.
13. The "January effect" in the municipal bond market causes an increase in
the implied tax rate; this would correspond to a decline in the relative price
of municipal bonds.
l4. The GLS procedure was implemented by estimating separate residual
variances for each twenty—nine month period, using the honioscedastic OLS resi-
duals, and then dividing each observation by the square root of the estimated
variance for its data period.
15. The pronounced effect of the personal tax change in the short term
marketmaybe due to the binding nature of Regulation Q during1969. Skelton
(1983) argues that during periods when Regulation Q wasbinding, banks were not
themarginal investors in the short—term municipal market.
16. Campbell (1980) argues against the segmentation view by claiming that
bank behavior is uncorrelated with the municipal—taxable yield spread. However,
he ignores the simultaneous determination of prices and quantities: under the
pure Miller model, the yield spread would not vary but bank behavior would
change often, leading to zero correlation!
17. This proposal for short—term borrowing and several related plans are
described in Beek (1982).
18. A summary of arguments for and against the taxable bond option, along
with much discussion, may be found in Mussa and Kormendi (1979).
19. The principal difficulty with the Miller model is that explaining the
large outstanding stock of corporate equity is difficult when only investors for
whom (1_T)(1_Te) (1—rn) should hold equity. With r =.I6and m reaching its
maximum at .50, only very low tax rates on equity are consistent with equity
holding.
20. Gordon and Slemrod (1983) discuss some of the issues concerning the size
of public capital stock, and assess the distributional effects of changing the
the tax exemption of municipal bonds.—51—
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